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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Patrick Tyler Maahs appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine. On appeal, Maahs challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A credit union teller called the police to report the suspicious behavior of three men. (R.,
p.226.) The teller reported that the men were talking to each other in the parking lot; one changed
his clothes; and then two entered the credit union while the third man remained in the parking lot.
(Id.) The teller informed police “that a very large cash deposit (or deposits) had been made.” (Id.)
The teller reported that the behavior of the three men made the tellers nervous. (Id.)
Two officers arrived quickly and detained the man in the parking lot. (Id.) Corporal
Reimers arrived shortly thereafter in his full uniform. (R., pp.226-27.) He proceeded directly into
the credit union without speaking to the officers in the parking lot. (R., p.226.) Corporal Reimers
was an experienced officer who had worked bank robberies in the past and knew that bank tellers
are specifically trained to observe unusual or suspicious situations that might indicate a possible
robbery. (R., pp.228-29.) Corporal Reimers entered a foyer through the exterior doors. (R., p.226;
8/27/18 Tr., p.88, L.20 – p.89, L.2.) However, he could not get inside the credit union because the
inner doors were locked, which puzzled him. (R., pp.226-27; 8/27/18 Tr., p.88, L.20 – p.89, L.11.)
Through the glass doors, he could see two men talking to a teller from the customer side of the
counter. (R., p.227; 8/27/18 Tr., p.89, L.22 – p.90, L.12.) No other customers were present. (R.,
p.227.)
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Maahs looked at Corporal Reimers from the teller’s counter for several seconds. (R.,
p.227; ----see also 8/27/18 Tr., p.90, Ls.15-22.) He then spoke to the man standing with him. (R.,
p.227.) The second man looked back in Corporal Reimers’s direction as well. (8/27/18 Tr., p.91,
Ls.4-14.) One man went quickly down a hallway, followed shortly thereafter by the other. (R.,
p.227; 8/27/18 Tr., p.91, Ls.4-19.) Corporal Reimers’s concern about the men’s abnormal
behavior was heightened by their quick reaction to his presence. (R., pp.227-28.)
A credit union employee unlocked the inner doors for Corporal Reimers and advised him
that a cash deposit in excess of $8,000 had just been made and that the men were now inside a
single-person bathroom together. (R., p.227; 8/27/18 Tr., p.93, L.2 – p.94, L.6.) A bank employee
informed the men before they entered the bathroom together that it was a single-person bathroom.
(8/27/18 Tr., p.93, L.12 – p.94, L.6.)
Fearing a possible attack, Corporal Reimers positioned himself behind a wall partition for
cover and radioed for assistance. (R., p.227.) Officer Mathis arrived to assist. (Id.) Corporal
Reimers explained to Officer Mathis what he had observed, expressed concern that something was
“hinky,” and said that he was going to wait for the men to come out of the bathroom. (Id.) Corporal
Reimers heard the toilet flush, and then Maahs stepped out of the bathroom into the hallway. (Id.)
Both officers told him to come over to them. (Id.) Maahs did not comply. (Id.) Instead, he looked
behind him towards a door at the end of the hallway and backed away from the officers towards
it. (Id.) Officer Mathis advanced towards Maahs, yelled “get over here,” and briefly drew his
weapon. (Id.; State’s Ex. 2, 00:26-00:45.) Officer Mathis instructed Maahs to get down. (R.,
p.227.) Maahs eventually complied, and repeatedly stated, “I’m not resisting, I’m not resisting.”
(R., pp.227-28.)
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As Officer Mathis advanced toward Maahs, Corporal Reimers moved towards the
bathroom door, drew his weapon, and ordered the second man to come out of the bathroom. (R.,
p.227.) Neither officer drew their firearm until after Maahs ignored their instructions and looked
as though he intended to flee. (R., pp.228-29.) The officers handcuffed both men and informed
them that they were being detained for an investigation. (R., pp.228-29). When Maahs asked what
was happening, the officer responded, “[T]hat is what we are trying to find out.” (R., p.228.)
Officer Mathis asked Maahs if he had any weapons or “sharps” on him. (Id.) The officer
patted Maahs down and found that he had a metal object in his pocket. (Id.) The officer removed
it and identified it as a Camas County Deputy Sheriff’s badge. (Id.) Maahs claimed to have found
it by the side of a road. (Id.)
There was considerable noise in the hallway. (Id.) So, Corporal Reimers decided that each
man should be questioned separately. (Id.) Each officer questioned a suspect. (Id.) Maahs was
“loudly questioning what was happening and kept up an almost constant chatter.” (R., p.229.)
Officer Mathis repeatedly told Maahs that he was not being arrested but was being detained for an
investigation. (Id.) Officer Mathis grew increasingly irritated as Maahs repeatedly asked the same
question. (Id.) Ultimately, Maahs said he did not want to talk to the officer anymore. (R., p.231.)
Without questioning Maahs further, Officer Mathis placed him in the patrol vehicle and told him
that the investigation could take ten minutes or longer. (R., pp.230-31.)
Corporal Reimers found a knife on the man who had been in the bathroom with Maahs.
(R., pp.229-30.) On the knife, the officer found a brown speck that in his training and experience
was consistent with heroin, white residue that tested positive for methamphetamine, and a piece of
vacuum-seal plastic. (R., p.231.) A search of the bathroom revealed plastic used in the vacuumsealing process, plastic baggies, oddly twisted towels, a fast food receipt with handwritten numbers

3

on the back of it, and water on the floor and on the plastic baggies. (R., p.230.) Bank employees
informed the officers that Maahs had made a cash deposit of $8140.00. (R., pp.230-31.)
Earlier, one of the officers who had remained in the parking lot radioed for the assistance
of a K-9 officer. (R., p.231.) The K-9 unit arrived quickly and alerted during a free air sniff of
Maahs’s car. (Id.) A search of the car uncovered a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, a scale, a vacuum
sealer, packaging material, Maahs’s probation and parole paperwork, and two safes containing
cocaine and about one pound of methamphetamine. (Id.; see also 8/27/18 Tr., p.46, Ls.2-12.)
The state charged Maahs with trafficking in methamphetamine; unlawful possession of a
firearm; two counts of concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence; and possession of
cocaine. (R., pp.38-40.) The state also alleged that Maahs was a persistent violator of the law.
(R., pp.57-58.)
Maahs filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.74-75.) Rather than file an independent
memorandum of law in support of the motion, Maahs’s trial counsel simply incorporated a
memorandum that had been drafted and filed by another attorney in Maahs’s co-defendant’s case.
(R., pp.76-81. 1)

Maahs then filed a pro se motion seeking conflict counsel based on his

dissatisfaction with his trial counsel’s work on the motion to suppress. (R., pp.84-90.) He also
filed a pro se motion to suppress. (R., pp.91-104.) Approximately two week later, Maahs’s trial
counsel filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion to suppress. (R., pp.108-15.) He
argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Maahs, that the duration of Maahs’s
seizure was unconstitutional even if the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him, that there

1

Maahs’s case was at one point consolidated with two co-defendants. (R., pp.14-17.) One of the
cases was ultimately severed. (R., pp.59-60.)
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was no legal cause to search Maahs’s person when he was detained, and that neither the inevitable
discovery nor the independent source doctrines applied in this case. (Id.)
The district court granted Maahs’s pro se motion for conflict counsel. (R., pp.117-18.)
Maahs’s newly appointed attorney filed a supplemental motion to suppress and memorandum in
support. (R., pp.123-92.) Maahs argued that the contraband found in his car must be suppressed
as fruit of the poisonous tree because the officers executed a formal arrest (rather than an
investigative detention) and that his seizure was unsupported by probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. (R., pp.126-45.)
The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. (R., pp.193-96, 199;
8/27/18 Tr., pp.71-176.) The state presented the testimony of two witnesses: Corporal Reimers
and Officer Mathis. (8/27/18 Tr., pp.83, 153.) Following the hearing, the state filed an objection
to Maahs’s suppression motion arguing that Maahs’s detention was justified by reasonable,
articulable suspicion. (R., pp.200-09.) Maahs filed a reply. (R., pp.210-21.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp.226-42.) The court concluded
that under the totality of the circumstances Maahs’s seizure did not constitute a formal arrest, and
that the investigative detention was justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion. (Id.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Maahs entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in
methamphetamine reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. (R., pp.243,
247.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.24649.) Maahs timely appealed. (R., pp.254-57.)
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ISSUES
Maahs states the issues on appeal as:
1. Whether this [C]ourt applies a deferential standard of review to the district court’s
factual findings, where this Court has the same bodycam recordings, and clips
therefrom, as the district court had in the record;
2. Did the district court err in concluding that there was reasonable suspicion to support a
brief investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, or did the district court improperly
rely on the hunches of credit union tellers and the police officers who had general
hunches that Mr. Maahs was engaged in criminal activity;
3. Did the district court err by failing to conclude that the police officers conducted a de
facto arrest of Mr. Maahs[?]
(Appellant’s brief, p.21.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Maahs failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Maahs Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Maahs first asserts this Court should not apply its well-settled standard of

review to the district court’s factual findings. (Appellant’s brief, p.22.) Maahs contends the Court
should freely review the evidence and weigh it in the same manner as the trial court. (Id.) Maahs
further argues that this Court’s independent review of the officer’s bodycam footage reveals that
the district court erroneously found (1) that Maahs “was intending to flee” from the officers before
they drew their firearms and (2) that Officer Mathis frisked him after he was handcuffed.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.23-25.) Next, Maahs asserts that the evidence seized from within his vehicle
must be suppressed because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying
an investigative detention. (Appellant’s brief, pp.26-32, 48.) Finally, Maahs asserts that the
district court erred by concluding that his seizure amounted to an investigative detention rather
than a de facto arrest. (Appellant’s brief, pp.32-48.)
Maahs has not shown any error in the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The
district court’s factual findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record.
The district court correctly concluded that Maahs’s seizure amounted to an investigative detention
not a de facto arrest because the degree of force used was reasonable to effectuate the seizure in
light of the surrounding circumstances. Finally, under a totality of the circumstances Maahs’s
detention was supported reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are
7

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found.” State v. Moore, 164 Idaho 379, 381, 430 P.3d 1278, 1280 (2018) (quoting
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004)).

C.

It Is Well Established That This Court Accepts The Trial Court’s Findings Of Fact That
Are Supported By Substantial Evidence
The Court’s “standard of review for constitutional suppression issues is well-established.”

State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 422, 901 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1995). On appeal from an order
resolving a motion to suppress evidence, the Court “accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 904, 454 P.3d 543, 546
(2019) (quoting State v. Mullins, 164 Idaho 493, 496, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018)). The appellate
courts grant deference to the trial court’s factual findings because “the power to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw
factual inferences, is vested in the trial court.” State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d
735, 737 (1986); see State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 491, 399 P.3d 804, 818 (2017) (stating that
the Court traditionally grants deference to the trial judge’s factual findings in light of the judge’s
“special opportunity to assess and weigh the credibility of the witnesses who appear.”) This wellsettled standard applies in this case. Maahs has failed to show otherwise.
Maahs erroneously argues that this Court should not “extend the usual deference to the
district court’s findings.” (Appellant’s brief, p.22.) Maahs contends that the Court “does not defer
to the district court’s evaluation” of evidence insofar as this Court has “the same bodycam
recordings” before it that the district court considered in ruling on the suppression motion. (Id.)
Relying on State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 429 P.3d 850 (2018), Maahs argues that the Court
should “freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the same manner as the trial court
would do.” (Id.) Maahs’s reliance on Andersen is misplaced.
8

In Andersen, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis of an alleged
Miranda 2 violation. Andersen, 164 Idaho at 311, 429 P.3d at 852. “When the motion came before
the district court for hearing, neither party presented testimony. Instead, the parties stipulated to
introduction of the preliminary hearing transcript and a video recording created by [the officer] of
her contact with [the defendant].” Id. (emphasis added). On appeal from the district court’s partial
denial of the motion to suppress, the Idaho Supreme Court found that it was presented with “the
unusual situation” where the Court had “exactly the same evidence before it as was considered by
the district court: the transcript of the preliminary hearing and the video recording ….” Id. at 31112, 429 P.3d at 852-53. Accordingly, the Court did not “extend the usual deference to the district
court’s evaluation of the evidence.” Id. Instead, the Court determined that in those limited
circumstances “its role on appeal is to freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the
same manner as the trial court would do.” Id. (quoting Lankford, 162 Idaho at 492, 399 P.3d at
819). The limited circumstances that provided for the Andersen Court’s free review of the
evidence admitted at the suppression hearing are not present in this case.
Unlike the Andersen Court, this Court does not have the same evidence before it as was
considered by the district court. Here, like in Andersen, the district court considered the officers’
bodycam footage and the preliminary hearing transcript in ruling on the motion to suppress. (States
Exs. 1-2; Defendant’s Ex. A; R., pp.199, 226. 3) However, in this case the state also presented the
live testimony of Officer Mathis and Corporal Reimers during the suppression hearing whereas in
Andersen neither party presented testimony. (8/27/18 Tr., pp.83, 153.) By considering the live
testimony of witnesses in ruling on Maahs’s motion to suppress, the district court exercised its

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

State’s exhibits 1 and 2 are saved as .mp4 files in the record and are titled “OBV –
Reimers 4.mp4” and “OBV – Mathis 3.mp4” respectively.
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power to assess the credibility of the witnesses, to resolve any conflicts in their testimony, to weigh
the evidence, and to draw factual inferences. Put differently, the court fulfilled its role as trier of
fact. Because the district court considered the officers’ live testimony in addition to the other
evidence submitted during the suppression hearing in ruling on Maahs’s motion to suppress, this
Court is not in the unusual situation in which the Andersen Court found itself, where the evidence
in the record before it is exactly the same evidence considered by the district court. (R., p.226.)
Accordingly, the standard of free review applied to the trial court’s factual findings in Andersen
is not applicable in this case.
Moreover, under Maahs’s proposed standard the appellate courts would usurp the role of
the trial courts as the triers of fact whenever any evidence in the record on appeal is the same as
the evidence considered by the trial court. It is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its view of the facts for that of the
trial court. See Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591, 598, 349 P.3d 1182, 1189 (2015). “The
appellate court’s role is simply to determine whether there is evidence in the record that a
reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon in making the factual finding that is challenged
on appeal.” Id. Taken to its logical conclusion, the standard Maahs seeks in this case would
eliminate the trial court’s role as trier of fact in virtually all cases that are actually appealed and
convert the appellate courts of this state into part-time trial courts. For these reasons, the Court
should apply its usual, well-established standard of review.

D.

Maahs Has Failed To Show That The District Court’s Factual Findings Are Clearly
Erroneous
The district court found that Maahs “ignor[ed]” the officer’s instructions to “come over to

them” after he exited the bathroom, and instead looked “as though he was intending to flee.” (R.,
pp.227-28.) The court also found that after Maahs was secured in handcuffs, the officers “quickly
10

asked” if he had “any weapons or ‘sharps’” and then “frisked” him. (R., p.228.) Maahs challenges
both of these findings. (Appellant’s brief, pp.23-25.)
First, Maahs’s arguments are premised upon his contention that this Court should make its
own factual findings. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-25.) At no point does he claim clear error under
the applicable standard. (Id.) As such, this Court should decline to review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error because Maahs has not requested this Court to do so. Suitts v. Nix,
141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005) (“Issues on appeal that are not supported by
propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered by the Supreme
Court.”).
Even if not waived, there is no clear error. “The factual findings of a trial court in a criminal
case ‘are reviewed for clear error ….’” State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 461 P.3d 774, 783 (2020)
(quoting State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796, 964 P.2d 660, 663 (1998)). The Court accepts the trial
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408,
283 P.3d 722, 725 (2012) (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)).
“Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent
evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009)). Here,
the district court’s findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record.
The first finding is supported by the officer’s on-body recordings and the testimony of both
Corporal Reimers and Officer Mathis. The on-body video footage clearly shows that after Maahs
was told to come towards the officers after he exited the bathroom, but that he looked towards the
door behind him and backed away from the officers instead. (State’s Ex. 1, 3:13-3:22; State’s Ex.
2, 00:24-00:33.) Consistent with the depictions recorded by the officers’ on-body video footage,
Corporal Reimers testified during the preliminary hearing that Maahs exited the bathroom, looked
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straight at the officers, and then appeared as if he was going to try to flee out of the door behind
him. (5/9/18 Tr., p.42, L.12 – p.43, L.1. 4) During the suppression hearing, Corporal Reimers
again testified that the officers directed Maahs to come towards them, but instead he “turned his
body towards that door in the hallway and appeared to be looking at that door, possibly as an
escape route.” (8/27/18 Tr., p.101, L.2 – p.103, L.9, p.126, Ls.18-25, p.139, L.21 – p.140, L.3.)
Officer Mathis also testified during the suppression hearing that Maahs “glanced over” and “started
going away from [the officers] towards another door” after he exited the bathroom. (8/27/18 Tr.,
p.158, L.10 – p.159, L.8, p.166, L.23 – p.167, L.11.)
The second finding is also supported by the testimony of Officer Mathis as well as the onbody video footage. Officer Mathis testified that he conducted a pat down search for weapons
after handcuffing Maahs. (8/27/18 Tr., p.159, L.21 – p.160, L.6.) During the pat down, he felt a
hard metal object in Maahs’s pocket that he subsequently removed. (8/27/18 Tr., p.160, Ls.7-23,
p.170, L.19 – p.171, L.18.) Officer Mathis’s on-body video footage also depicts the pat down.
(State’s ex. 2, 1:01-1:55.) Because these challenged findings are supported by substantial and
competent evidence in the record, this Court should accept those findings. Maahs has failed to
show otherwise.
Maahs argues that the court erroneously found that he attempted to flee from the officers
as he exited the bathroom. (Appellant’s brief, pp.23-25.) According to Maahs, he simply
“backpedaled and turned to his left out of confusion and bewilderment rather than an attempt to
flee.” (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) He claims that this Court’s independent review of the bodycam
footage will reveal that he was not seeking to escape, but rather “was just instinctively backing

4

The transcript of the preliminary hearing was admitted during the suppression hearing and is
contained in the record as an exhibit. (See Defendant’s Ex. A.)
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away from the confrontational Officer Mathis, who drew and pointed his firearm at him.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.23.) Maahs is incorrect for two reasons.
First, Maahs’s argument fails because this court does not conduct an independent review
of the evidence in the record. On appeal, Maahs has merely reasserted an interpretation of the
evidence that the district court properly rejected in fulfilling its role as fact finder below. (See R.,
pp.129-31, 227-28.) It is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence, judge the
credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Second,
under the correct standard of review, Maahs has not argued – much less shown – that the district
court’s findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. Nor could he make such
a showing. The testimony of the officers both during the preliminary hearing and the suppression
hearing, as well as the officers’ on-body video footage supports the district court’s conclusion that
Maahs ignored the officer’s instructions and looked as though he intended to flee.
Next, Maahs argues that the district court erroneously found that Maahs was “frisked” after
he was handcuffed. (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) Contrary to Maahs’s contention, the video evidence
supports the district court’s finding as it shows the officer pat down Maahs’s clothing and then
reach inside his pocket to remove keys (which the officer testified can be used as a weapon), a
lighter, and the hard metal object that ultimately turned out to be the Camas County Sheriff’s
badge. (State’s Ex. 2, 00:50-01:50.) In sum, Maahs has failed to show that the district court’s
findings of fact are clearly erroneous.

E.

Maahs Was Seized For Fourth Amendment Purposes When He Submitted To The Officer’s
Authority
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A seizure occurs—and the Fourth

Amendment is implicated—when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
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in some way restrained a citizen’s liberty.” State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700,
705 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct. App. 1991)).
“The critical inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the
encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Id. (citing Fry, 122 Idaho at 104,
831 P.2d at 945).
In this case, the district court concluded that Maahs was seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.233-34.) The state does not contest the court’s determination that
Maahs was seized.
For the first time on appeal Maahs asserts that the officers seized him “immediately when
he emerged from the bathroom” before he turned and backpedaled because Corporal Reimer
motioned with his finger for Maahs to come to him and Officer Mathis ordered him to come over.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.26-27.) Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the
first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). This argument
was not presented to the district court for findings and conclusion. (See R., pp.74-81, 108-15, 12644.) To the extent the Court reviews Maahs’s contention that he was seized immediately upon
exiting the bathroom, he is incorrect.
Maahs was not seized until he submitted to the officers’ show of authority and was placed
in handcuffs. In order for a Fourth Amendment seizure to have occurred, there must either be
some application of physical force, even if extremely slight, or a show of authority to which the
subject yields. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623-29 (1991). “A necessary condition for
there to be a seizure effected through a ‘show of authority’ is words and/or actions by a police
officer that would have conveyed to a reasonable person that he or she was being ordered to restrict
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his or her movement.” State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 820, 103 P.3d 430, 433 (2004) (citing
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621). However, “[a]n oral command constituting a show of authority does
not constitute a seizure unless the person yields to that command.” Id.; see also State v.
Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (holding that the defendant submitted to
the officers’ show of authority by remaining at the scene and stepping out of his car as the officers
approached such that he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes).
Even if a reasonable person would believe that Maahs was not free to leave when the
officers told him to come towards them, there was no seizure at that point because Maahs did not
yield to the officer’s command. Rather, he looked back towards a door at the opposite end of the
hallway and backed away from the officers towards it. Not until after Officer Mathis advanced
towards him, drew his weapon, yelled “get over here,” and placed Maahs in handcuffs did Maahs
submit to the show of authority. Maahs was only seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment once he submitted to the officer’s show of authority.

F.

Maahs’s Seizure Amounted To An Investigative Detention, Not A De Facto Arrest
The district court correctly concluded that Maahs’s seizure amounted to an investigative

detention. “A seizure may take the form of either an arrest or an investigative detention.” State
v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). “An arrest is characterized
as a full-scale seizure of the person requiring probable cause.” Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479, 988
P.2d at 705 (citing State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 726-27, 701 P.2d 671, 674-75 (Ct. App. 1985)).
“An investigative detention is characterized as a seizure of limited duration which, when supported
by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, falls within a judicially created exception to the
probable cause requirement.” Id. (citing Zapp, 108 Idaho at 726-27, 701 P.2d at 674-75).
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“There is no bright line rule for determining when a Terry stop has escalated into an arrest.”
State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 430, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App.1996). “Much as a ‘bright
line’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable,
common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” Pannell, 127
Idaho at 423, 901 P.2d at 1324 (citations omitted). “The factors to be considered in distinguishing
an investigative stop from a de facto arrest include the seriousness of the crime, the location of the
encounter, the length of the detention, the reasonableness of the officer’s display of force, and the
conduct of the suspect as the encounter unfolds.” Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 480, 988 P.2d at 706
(citing Martinez, 129 Idaho at 431, 925 P.2d at 1130). In this case, the district court correctly
found that “the steps [the officers] took did not convert the Terry stop into an arrest.” (R., p.234.)
The factors considered in distinguishing an investigative detention from a de facto arrest
support the district court’s conclusion. This encounter occurred at a credit union while several
civilian employees were in the building. (R., p.241.) Initially, Corporal Reimers suspected a
potential bank robbery, fraud, or some other crime. (R., pp.229, 237; 8/27/18 Tr., p.87, Ls.14-18.)
Then, considering the large amounts of cash involved and the fact that the men “jetted” to the
single-person bathroom together after noticing his presence, he also began to suspect possible
drugs crimes. (R., p.239; 8/27/18 Tr., p.93, L.2 – p.95, L.21, p.99, Ls.14-25.)
The district court made no specific finding about the exact duration of Maahs’s detention,
but did conclude that the totality of the circumstances “justified … [the] length of the detention.”
(R., p.241.) Importantly, once all three men were detained, the officers performed tasks directly
related to investigating the various crimes they suspected were afoot. To verify or dispel their
suspicions, the officers conferred amongst each other to share information, made efforts to get
more information in order to determine what exactly had been going on, and discussed how Maahs
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was in possession of a deputy sheriff’s badge. (R., pp.230-31.) Corporal Reimers spoke to a credit
union employee and made sure the exact cash that Maahs had deposited be maintained. (R.,
pp.230-31.) Radio traffic initially delayed the provision of Maahs’s driver’s license information
to dispatch, but approximately fifteen minutes after he activated his body camera, dispatch
informed Officer Mathis that Maahs was on supervised released with the Idaho Department of
Correction. (Id.)
Additionally, the officers outside the credit union requested the assistance of a K-9 unit,
which arrived quickly and alerted on Maahs’s car. (Id.) “[W]hen a reliable drug-detection dog
indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer
has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it without a
warrant.” State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005)). The officers’ subsequent
search of Maahs’s vehicle revealed a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, a scale, a vacuum sealer, packaging
material, Maahs’s probation and parole paperwork, and two safes containing cocaine and about
one pound of methamphetamine. (R., p.231; 8/27/18 Tr., p.46, Ls.2-12.) At that point in Maahs’s
seizure, the officers undoubtedly had sufficient probable cause to make a warrantless legal arrest.
Moreover, the district court correctly determined that the “manner … of the detention” was
both “justified” and “reasonable” considering the behavior of the suspects prior to Maahs’s
detention. (R., pp.233-34, 241.) “A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to … maintain
the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of
the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citation
omitted). In maintaining the status quo, the use of handcuffs may be a reasonable precaution for
ensuring the officer’s safety and does not necessarily transform a lawful investigative detention
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into an arrest. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 878, 736 P.2d 1327, 1332 (1987) (citing United
States v. Purry, 545 F.2d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (concluding officers’ decision to handcuff
defendant as part of an investigatory detention was justified because defendant attempted to pull
away from officer when contacted within area of armed robbery)). “[B]ased upon the specific
facts of the situation and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, officers are entitled to
use handcuffs in limited investigatory stops to maintain their safety.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho
550, 553-54, 961 P.2d 641, 644-45 (1998). Likewise, placing a handcuffed suspect in the back of
a police car may be a reasonable means to protect the safety of the officers without necessarily
converting a lawful Terry stop into an illegal arrest. State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 369, 986 P.2d
1030, 1035 (Ct. App. 1999). Finally, an investigative detention does not necessarily transform
into an arrest simply because the officers effectuate the seizure with guns drawn. See State v.
Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 265-67, 47 P.3d 763, 768-70 (Ct. App. 2001). Ultimately, “[t]he
reasonableness of a stop is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances confronting
the officer at the time of the stop.” Id., 137 Idaho at 265, 47 P.3d at 768 (citing United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 526, 826 P.2d 481, 487 (Ct.
App. 1991)).
Under the totality of the circumstances, the measures used to seize Maahs were reasonable
and did not convert his temporary investigative seizure into an arrest. Maahs was detained in a
credit union, with civilian credit union employees nearby. (R., p.241.) Before he was detained,
he entered a single-person bathroom with his accomplice shortly after observing the uniformed
Corporal Reimers. (R., pp.226-27.) After spending several minutes in the restroom together and
flushing the toilet, Maahs exited the bathroom into the hallway. (R., p.227-28; 8/27/28 Tr., p.98,
Ls.1-11.) Upon being told to come toward the officers, Maahs “looked at the door behind him and
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began moving towards it while ignoring the officer’s directions to come forward.” (R., p.234.)
The officers only drew their weapons in order to seize Maahs after he did so “[b]ecause he
appeared to be ready to flee out a door that no one at the time was certain where it led.” (R.,
p.233.) It was Maahs’s “apparent efforts to flee” that “triggered [the] more forceful response by
the police officers.” (R., p.234.)
Beyond his apparent efforts to flee, the court also found that under the circumstances the
officers were in a vulnerable position. (Id.) In order to detain Maahs, Officer Mathis “had to pass
by the bathroom door” and was thus “vulnerable to the man still in the restroom.” (R., p.233.)
Both Corporal Reimers and Officer Mathis were experienced policemen who were “confronting a
suspicious but uncertain situation.” (R., p.233.) These experienced officers were entitled to draw
from the facts in light of their experience that their safety was in danger. Johns, 112 Idaho at 878,
736 P.2d at 1332.
The court also correctly concluded that “[i]t was reasonable to handcuff Maahs and
necessary to remove him to a place which would allow the purpose of the stop to continue.” (R.,
p.234.) Civilian credit union employees were still inside the credit union when Maahs was seized.
(R., p.241.) He had tried to evade the police twice prior to his detention. (Id.) He was loudly
repeating the same question over and over such that “it was impossible to even hear in the
hallway.” (Id.) At that moment, the officers were simultaneously dealing with three separate
suspects. (Id.) Under these circumstances, the use of handcuffs and placing Maahs temporarily
in a patrol vehicle to maintain officer safety and prevent any further attempts to flee the scene as
the officers worked to confirm or dispel their suspicions was reasonable and did not transform the
investigative detention into an arrest. In light of the location of the encounter, the serious crimes
suspected, the reasonable length of the detention, the reasonableness of the officer’s display of
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force, and Maahs’s conduct as the encounter unfolded, the manner of Maahs’s detention was
reasonable and did not convert the otherwise lawful investigative detention into an arrest.
Maahs asserts that the officers “[t]ransformed the seizure … into a de facto arrest.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.32 (underline in original).) He first argues that the factors weigh in favor of
concluding that he officers conducted an arrest. (Appellant’s brief, pp.33-39.) According to
Maahs, the seriousness of the crimes does not weigh in favor of the level of force used to detain
him because the officers “were unable to identify with any clarity what they suspected” him of
committing. (Appellant’s brief, pp.33-34.) However, the Corporal Reimers’s words to which
Maahs cites for support belie his contention. (Appellant’s brief, p.34.) Corporal Reimers
consistently maintained that he initially suspected that “there’s a potential robbery going on or
something of a similar nature.” (8/27/18 Tr., p.107, L.9 – p.108, L.6; see also R., pp.228-29, 237.)
Furthermore, Maahs has provided no authority to support his claim that the location and length of
the detention supports the conclusion that the seizure constituted a de facto arrest, especially
considering the district court’s conclusion that the length of the seizure was justified. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.34-35.)
Maahs primarily suggests the manner in which he was seized rendered the seizure an arrest
because of the what he alleges was the “unreasonably extreme manner in which [he] was seized
by the officers.” (Appellant’s brief, p.35.) In support of his claim that the measures taken to
effectuate his detention were unreasonable, Maahs cites United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez,
856 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1988). (Appellant’s brief, p.34.) However, this case does not
support his claim. According to Maahs, in that case the Ninth Circuit held that the use of handcuffs
on a suspected drug trafficker by officers brandishing firearms constituted an arrest and that the
nature of the crime was not something that inherently justified the use of such measures. (Id.)
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However, that case is factually distinguishable from this case in at least one important way that
Maahs failed to mention in his brief. In determining that the seizure in that case was an arrest not
an “investigatory Terry-type stop,” the court relied primarily on the fact that “the agents
immediately told the men that they were under arrest.” Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d at 129596. Here, Maahs was repeatedly told not that he was under arrest but that he was merely being
detained for purposes of an investigation.
Maahs also cites several Idaho cases that he argues weigh in favor of the conclusion that
the officers executed an arrest. First, he cites Kessler v. Barowsky, 129 Idaho 640, 931 P.2d 634
(Ct. App. 1996), a civil case, arguing that “Officer Mathis exceeded constitutional grounds by
drawing and pointing his weapon.” (Appellant’s brief, p.38.) In Kessler, the Court was discussing
situations in which deadly force was actually used. Kessler, 129 Idaho at 656, 931 P.2d at 650. In
this case, the officers merely unholstered their firearms but did not actually use deadly force against
Maahs. Thus, Kessler has no application to this case.
Maahs also relies on Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 901 P.2d 1321, arguing that the use of
handcuffs and placing the suspect in the back of a patrol vehicle amounted to an arrest.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.41-42.) In that case, the Court determined that the use of handcuffs and
placing the defendant in the back of the patrol car exceeded the bounds of the investigatory
detention because the evidence was insufficient to justify the use of handcuffs as part of an
investigatory detention. Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424-25, 901 P.2d at 1325-26. The officers in that
case handcuffed Pannell and placed him in a patrol car to transport him home following reports of
a domestic dispute despite the fact that “[r]ather than resist the officers or attempt to escape,
Pannell was fully compliant with the officers at all times during the extended period that he was
detained at the side of the road before the handcuffs were applied.” Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the officers handcuffed him after searching his truck and determining that there were
no weapons of any kind. Id.
Maahs also relies on Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998). In that case, the Court
determined that the need for handcuffs was “considerably less” than in Pannell because there were
at least six officers on scene and just two suspects, and the two suspects “had at all times complied
with the requests of the officers and there was no indication that either man was armed.” Buti, 131
Idaho at 797, 964 P.2d at 664 (emphasis added). This case is distinguishable from both Pannell
and Buti.
Here, the officers only used handcuffs to effectuate Maahs’s detention after he initially
tried to evade the police by going into a single-person bathroom with his accomplice, ignored the
officers’ after he exited the bathroom, and backed away from them as though he was going to flee.
Thus, unlike the defendants in Pannell and Buti, Maahs did not comply with the officers before he
was handcuffed. Furthermore, the pat down search of Maahs’s accomplice revealed that he was
in possession of a knife at the time of their detention, unlike Pannell who was entirely unarmed.
Under the circumstances of this case, the use of handcuffs was entirely reasonable in light of the
officer’s training and experience and the reasonable inferences drawn from the facts known to
them at the time. See DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 961 P.2d 641 (distinguishing Pannell and holding
that an officer need not be absolutely certain that an individual was armed to conduct a stop and
to frisk the individual but could rely on his experience and draw specific, reasonable inferences
from the facts known at the time.)
Finally, Maahs asserts that Officer Mathis exceeded the bounds of a pat down search after
handcuffing him, which further establishes that he was arrested, not merely subjected to a Terry
stop. (Appellant’s brief, pp.39-40.) This argument fails because Maahs failed to show that the
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district court’s finding that the officer’s frisked him was unsupported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record. Even if the Court determines that Maahs the pat down search exceeded its
lawful scope, Maahs has supported his contention that a subsequent search that exceeds the scope
of a Terry frisk for weapons converts and otherwise lawful investigative detention into an unlawful
arrest.

G.

Maahs’s Investigative Detention Was Supported By Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion
Maahs’s temporary investigative seizure was justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion.

“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are
unreasonable.” State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 264, 371 P.3d 316, 318 (2016) (quoting Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). Brief investigatory detentions implicate the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). To be
reasonable, a limited investigatory seizure based on less than probable cause must be “justified by
an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a
crime.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983)).
“The standard of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ is not a particularly high or onerous
standard to meet.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, 283 P.3d at 727. “The officer must simply be acting
on more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and
the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at
1210 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.
App. 2003)). “Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality
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of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at
811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citations omitted). “[E]vasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
In this case, Corporal Reimers testified regarding his own personal observations and the
circumstances surrounding his encounter with Maahs – including the rational inferences drawn
therefrom in light of his training and experience – that formed the basis of his suspicions. Corporal
Reimers responded to the credit union because a teller called the police to report the suspicious
behavior of three men. (R., p.226.) The teller reported that the three men had engaged in
conversation in the credit union’s parking lot, one changed his clothing, and then two came into
the credit union to make a large cash deposit while the third remained in the parking lot. (Id.) This
behavior made the tellers nervous. (Id.) Upon arriving at the credit union, Corporal Reimers knew
that two officers had detained a man in the parking lot. (R., p.239.) He proceeded directly into
the credit union alone without speaking to them. (Id.)
Corporal Reimers was able to get through the outermost doors but could not proceed past
the interior doors, which were locked. (Id.) Through the glass doors he saw two men at the counter
speaking to a teller. (Id.) He observed Maahs become aware of his presence and then speak to the
other man. (R. pp.227, 239.) After the second man looked back at him, the men proceeded down
a hallway and into a single-person bathroom together. (R., p.239; 8/27/18 Tr., p.91, Ls.4-14.) A
credit union employee unlocked the interior door for Corporal Reimers. (Id.) Corporal Reimers
knew that both men were in a one-person bathroom with the door closed. (Id.) Fearing an attack,
he took cover behind a wall and called for backup. (R., p.227.) Officer Mathis arrived to assist.
(Id.) They heard the toilet flush. (R., pp.227, 239.) Then, Maahs exited the bathroom and the
officers told him to come over to them. (R., p.227.) Maahs ignored the instructions, backed away
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from the officers, and looked behind him towards a door at the end of the hallway as though he
intended to flee. (R., pp.227-28, 239.)
In light of Corporal Reimers’s training and experience, these specific facts and the rational
inferences drawn therefrom, which were found to be true by the district court, supported a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The court found Corporal Reimers was an
experienced police officer with decades of experience. (R., p.239.) Of particular importance, he
had investigated bank robberies and worked with bank tellers in the past. (Id. 5) Based on his
experience, he knew that bank tellers are specifically trained to be observant for potential
robberies. (Id.) Considering Corporal Reimers’s training and experience, he properly gave weight
to the tellers concerns that the circumstances described in the call represented a potential risk of
robbery, fraud, or some other crime. (R., pp.229, 237; 8/27/18 Tr., p.87, Ls.14-18.)
Upon entering the credit union, he was puzzled by the locked doors, which indicated to
him that the bank employees were either attempting to “detain someone inside or prevent others
from getting inside.” (R., p.227; 8/27/18 Tr., p.88, L.20 – p.89, L.11. 6) Corporal Reimers’s
suspicion regarding the men’s abnormal behavior was heightened further by their quick reaction
to his presence. (R., pp.227-28.) While attempting to evade the police is “not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing … it is certainly suggestive of such.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Under
the totality of the circumstances, Maahs’s attempt to avoid contact with Corporal Reimers, who

5

Likewise, Officer Mathis had twenty years of law enforcement experience, which included the
investigation of bank robberies. (8/27/21 Tr., p.153, L.23 – p.154, L.4, p.157, L.19 – p.158, L.9.)
6

As it turned out, the inner doors were locked because it was almost closing time. (R., p.238.)
But, the officer did not learn this fact until “the end of the entire encounter,” and testified that it
did not cross his mind at the time that the doors were locked because the bank was closed. (Id.;
8/27/18 Tr., p.89, Ls.12-21.)
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was in full police uniform, after making or attempting to make a large cash deposit is not merely
unusual, it is suspicious.
The fact that the two men proceeded to enter into a single-person bathroom together after
noticing the officer entering the credit union was also suspicious to the officer. Corporal Reimers
testified that he had significant narcotics training. (8/27/18 Tr., p.84, L.8 – p.85, L.3, p.95, Ls.921.) Based on his training and experience, he knew bathrooms are “a great place to destroy drugs”
by flushing the evidence. (8/27/18 Tr., p.94, L.7 – p.95, L.1, p.99, Ls.14-25.) Due to the large
sums of money and the fact that the two men entered a single-person bathroom together after
observing him, raised his suspicion that a potential drug crime was occurring. (Id.) Finally, before
he was detained Maahs ignored the officers who were telling him to come towards them after he
exited the bathroom. Rather than comply, he looked back towards the door behind him at the end
of the hallway and backed away from the officer towards it as if he intended to flee. Considered
together, these specific, articulable facts supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Importantly, the relatively low standard of “reasonable suspicion does not require a belief
that any specific criminal activity is afoot to justify an investigative detention.” State v. PerezJungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014). “Instead, all that is required is a
showing of objective and specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual has
been or is about to be involved in some criminal activity.” Id. Under a totality of the circumstances
and in light of the officers’ training and experience, Maahs’s detention was based on reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that the men were about to be commit a crime,
“possibly, a robbery or some other crime” like “fraud.” (R., p.229; 8/27/18 Tr., p.87, Ls.14-18.)
The purpose of an investigatory detention “is not permanently fixed, however, at the
moment the stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of
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criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop.” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88
P.3d at 1224 (citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App .2000)). In
this case, it became quickly apparent to the officers after they detained the men that drug activity
was more likely afoot than a robbery. (R., p.238.) As the officers detained Maahs and the other
man who accompanied him into the bathroom, another officer arrived, searched the bathroom, and
then reported his findings to Corporal Reimers. (R., p.240.) The officer discovered plastic
baggies, oddly twisted towels, plastic used in the vacuum-sealing process consistent with the
plastic found on the knife, a fast food receipt with handwritten numbers on the back of it, and water
on the floor and on the plastic baggies. (R., p.230.) Corporal Reimers also found a knife on the
man who had been in the bathroom with Maahs. (R., pp.229-31.) That knife bore a brown speck
consistent with heroin, white residue that tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine, and
a piece of vacuum-seal plastic. (Id.) Additionally, the drug detecting K-9 alerted to the presence
of illegal substances in the car Maahs drove to the bank. (R., p.231.) A search of the car uncovered
a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, drug paraphernalia, Maahs’s probation and parole paperwork, and two
safes containing cocaine and methamphetamine. (Id.; 8/27/18 Tr., p.46, Ls.2-12.) In any event,
the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity was supported by specific, articulable facts at the time
Maahs was seized.
Maahs asserts that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
an investigative detention. (Appellant’s brief, pp.27-32.) According to Maahs, the officers had
four pieces of information at the time he was seized (Appellant’s brief, pp.27-28), and that none
of them amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity whether considered “separately or in
combination.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.27-28.) Maahs’s argument is unpersuasive.
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The determination of whether an officer “possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated
based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.”
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Maahs ignores
significant facts and circumstances surrounding his seizure that the district court found to be true
and were considered by the officers to justify his detention in light of their training and experience.
The district court properly considered the totality of the circumstances, not just the particular facts
and circumstances culled by Maahs, which amounted to a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot.
Maahs also argues that the officers’ general expressions of their concerns that something
was amiss underscores how they lacked objective justification for their actions. (Appellant’s brief,
p.30.)

Reasonable suspicion certainly requires more than a mere hunch or “inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). However, the officer’s statements do not show that the officers
were proceeding on a mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion.
To the contrary, throughout his testimony Corporal Reimers provided a factual basis for
his suspicion that either a robbery, fraud, or drug crime was afoot based on his training and
decades-long career in law enforcement. (8/27/18 Tr., pp.83-152.) The statements he made in the
heat of the moment describing the situation as “hinky” and stating “I don’t know what we have
exactly” do not negate the objective facts and circumstances that he testified to and that the court
found to amount to a reasonable suspicion. See State v. Bonner, 167 Idaho 88, ___, 467 P.3d 452,
460 (2020) (“[T]he officer’s testimony that Bonner’s behavior, both before and after he parked his
vehicle, made him feel ‘like something more was going on,’ cannot be brushed away as a mere
hunch that a crime related to the vehicle was in progress.”) In other words, that the officer did not
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articulate to the assisting officer in the heat of the moment and fearing a possible attack what
“definitively” was going on does not shield Maahs from an investigative detention based on
reasonable suspicion. Rather, these statements merely highlight the difference between an officer
proceeding on probable cause and one proceeding on reasonable suspicion. (See 8/27/18 Tr., p.96,
L.13 – p.97, L.21.) Corporal Reimers clarified through his testimony at the suppression hearing
that at the time he made those statements he could not say “definitively” that either a robbery or a
drug crime was in progress like he could if for example he came across a victim with a gunshot
wound. (Id.)
To some extent, Maahs argues that even if his behavior was abnormal or suspicious, it was
insufficient to amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

“A determination that

reasonable suspicion exists … need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). “Yet, if the mere possibility of an innocent explanation were
all that is necessary to undermine an otherwise valid investigatory detention based on reasonable
suspicion of criminal behavior, it would severely limit the ability of law enforcement officers to
prevent crime and ensure public safety.” Bonner, 167 Idaho at ___, 467 P.3d at 459.
For example, under such an approach the defendant in Terry—the seminal case for
investigative stops of this nature—could have suppressed the results of the officer’s
stop on the grounds that his ‘elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of
the store window’ might have merely been window shopping, rather than ‘casing’
the premises in preparation for a burglary.
Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 6; -see --also ------Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (“Even in Terry, the conduct
justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation.”)). “It would be
naive to assume that most criminal defendants, even unsophisticated ones, do not attempt to avoid
detection and mask their true intentions by acting in an ambiguous manner so that they may appear
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beyond suspicion.” Id. Here, any conduct that could be characterized as ambiguous does not
undermine the validity of Maahs’s investigatory detention under a totality of the circumstances.
In sum, this Court should apply its well-settled standard of review in conducting a review
of the district court’s factual findings. This Court should accept the findings of fact that Maahs
challenges on appeal as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record,
and he has failed to show otherwise. The district court correctly determined that Maahs’s seizure
amounted to an investigative detention, not a de facto arrest. Finally, the district court correctly
concluded that Maahs’s investigative detention was justified by reasonable suspicion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2021.
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